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    <link>http://www.phpdeveloper.org</link>
    <description>Up-to-the Minute PHP News, views and community</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 14:42:50 -0500</pubDate>
    <ttl>30</ttl>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[PHP.net: PHP 5.3.10 Released (Security Fix - Recommended Upgrade)]]></title>
      <guid>http://www.phpdeveloper.org/news/17492</guid>
      <link>http://www.phpdeveloper.org/news/17492</link>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>
The PHP development team has <a href="http://www.php.net/index.php#id2012-02-02-1">officially announced</a> the release of the latest version of PHP in the 5.3.x series - <a href="http://www.php.net/downloads.php">PHP 5.3.10</a>:
</p>
<blockquote>
The PHP development team would like to announce the immediate availability of PHP 5.3.10. This release delivers a critical security fix. [...] Fixed arbitrary remote code execution vulnerability reported by Stefan Esser, CVE-2012-0830.
</blockquote>
<p>
It is highly recommended that users upgrade to this latest version to avoid falling victim to <a href="http://thexploit.com/sec/critical-php-remote-vulnerability-introduced-in-fix-for-php-hashtable-collision-dos/">this recently introduced bug</a> relating to the new "max_input_vars" setting added to protect from the overflow issue <a href="http://phpdeveloper.org/news/17322">recently brought up</a> in the PHP community.
</p>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Feb 2012 08:01:29 -0600</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Freek Lijten's Blog: The real problem of the hash table dos attack]]></title>
      <guid>http://www.phpdeveloper.org/news/17328</guid>
      <link>http://www.phpdeveloper.org/news/17328</link>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>
In response to some of the comments being made about the hash table Denial of Service attack <a href="http://phpdeveloper.org/news/17322">recently posted</a> <i>Freek Lijten</i> has <a href="http://www.freeklijten.nl/home/2011/12/29/The-real-problem-of-the-hash-table-dos-attack">posted his thoughts</a> about the real problem with the whole situation - how it was handled by the communities involved.
</p>
<blockquote>
Interesting they may be, but I want to address what in my opinion is the real problem: The way the communication around it was handled by different projects and the fact that the exploit could still exist at all. [...] In the presentation <a href="https://twitter.com/#!/zeri42">W&auml;lde</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/#!/alech">Klink</a> talk about their disclosure process. The PHP project had them wait 3 weeks for a first response while this is obviously a serious matter.
</blockquote>
<p>
He argues that things like a commit message mentioning a DoS prevention fix instead of just mentioning the fix have the potential to do more harm than good. He also points out that other communities were notified of the problem (like Python) and some still haven't responded to the issue.
</p>
<blockquote>
This attack was the result of good research and it is important that it is disclosed. More importantly however is the fact that organisation got by with years of not noticing it and even worse, reacted very poor after being informed. I can't say I have a ready solution to avoid these kind of things in the future, perhaps that will prove to be an interesting discussion.
</blockquote>]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2011 12:53:35 -0600</pubDate>
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